

Deva,daha Sutta

The Discourse at Deva,daha

[Self-mortification, fatalism, karma & omniscience]

(Majjhima Nikāya 101/2:214-228)

Translated by Piya Tan ©2005

1 Deva,daha

Deva,daha was a market town (*nigama*) of the Sakyas and the Koliyas,¹ the clan of Mahā Māyā, the Buddha's mother. The Koliyas lived on the east side of the Rohinī river, while the Sakyas on the other.² The river has been identified with what is today a small stream, called Rowai or Rohwainī, that joins the Rapti at Gorakhpur.³ The Koliyas have two main settlements, one at Rāma,gāma, the capital, identified with the present Rampur Deoriya in the district of Basti in Oudh, North India,⁴ and the other at Devadaha, located probably about 38 km east of Lumbinī.⁵

According to the Commentaries,⁶ Deva,daha was the city of the birth of Mahā Māyā, the Buddha's mother, and of Mahā Pajāpatī Gotamī,⁷ and of their companions, who married the Sakyas of Kapilavastu,⁸ the tribe to which the Buddha himself belonged. The Jātaka Commentary says that Mahā Māyā was on her way to Devadaha, when she gave birth to the Bodhisattva at Lumbinī forest (*Lumbinī,vana*).

The name, Deva,daha ("divine lake") was originally that of a lake, so called either because the Sakya rajahs sported in it, or because it came into existence of itself (that is, naturally), hence, divine. The name was later transferred to the market town nearby (MA 4:1; SA 2:256).

According to the Dulva (the Tibetan Vinaya),⁹ the city was founded by Sakyas from Kapilavastu, when they grew very numerous. The spot was pointed out by a deva, hence its name.

The Buddha stayed there during his tours and exhorted the monks on various topics, as recorded in **the Deva,daha Sutta** (M 101),¹⁰ **the (Pacchā,bhūma,gāmikā) Deva,daha Sutta** (S 22.2),¹¹ and **the (Sekha) Deva,daha Sutta** (S 35.134).¹²

2 Sutta summary

1.1 REFUTING NIRGRANTHA DOCTRINES. This Sutta—on the true nature of karma and spiritual practice—is taught by the Buddha unprompted [§1], and opens with the Buddha demonstrating the falsity of

¹ DPPN says that it was "a township (*nigāma*) of the Sakyas." It is likely that the Devadaha was the common market-town of both tribes, both of whom were kshatriyas and often intermarried. The Dīgha Comy, for example, says that once Koliya youths carried away many Sakya maidens while they were bathing, but the Sakyas, regarding the Koliyas as relatives, did not object (DA:SHB 1:262).

² DA 2:672 f; SA 1:67; SnA 1:358; J 5:412; DhA 3:254 ff; ThaA 214; ThīA 140 f. See also Tha:RD 1913:249.

³ Alexander Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India* 12:190 ff.

⁴ Jack Finegan 1989:81.

⁵ **Lumbinī** is today a small town in the Nepal, lying between Tiulihawa and Bhairawa, about 25 km east of Tilaurakot. Lumbini is also the name of the whole administrative zone that includes of Kapilavastu, Rupandehi and other administrative zones. Its administrative centre, Bhairawa, lies immediately to the east of the district of Kapilavastu, of which Tiulihawa is the administrative centre.

⁶ MA 4:182; AA 1:340; J 1:52; BA.226; ThīA 75, 182.

⁷ Ap2 17.115/2:528

⁸ Recent archaeological digs in Nepal have confirmed that **Kapila,vastu** is identified Tilaurakot, 25 km west of Lumbinī, and 3 km north of the village of Tiulihawa:

<http://www.lakehouse.lk/budusarana/2006/03/14/Budu16.pdf>.

⁹ WW Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, 1884:12.

¹⁰ M 101/2:214-228 = SD 18.4: on karma and omniscience.

¹¹ S 22.2/3:5-9: Sāriputta exhorts monks who are leaving for the west country on how to teach the Dharma.

¹² S 35.134/4:124-126: on what the learners still have to do for liberation..

the view that all our feelings are caused by past deeds,¹³ and when he questions the Nirgranthas, they betray a total lack of personal verification of their belief [§§2-6]. The parable of the painful dart follows, demonstrating the direct experience of pain [§§7-9]. The Buddha then goes on to mention that the Jain leader, Nirgrantha Nāta,putta or Mahā,vīra, claims to be omniscient. This remark is understandable because Nāta,putta's pupils look to his "omniscience" as the basis for their beliefs about karma [§10].¹⁴

The Buddha then presents the five doubtful points, which actually serve as the basis for the Nirgranthas' beliefs. Such beliefs are however dubious, as they may turn out to be either true or false [§11]. The painful asceticism of the Nirgranthas only brings them pain, and the Buddha establishes this point as the basis for his ensuing argument [§12-13]. The Buddha goes on to argue his point, thus:

When you indulge in painful self-mortification, you *do* feel its painful effects; but when you do not do so, you do *not* feel any such effect. Therefore, you are mistaken in thinking that all feelings are caused by past deed, and that asceticism would end such karma, which in turn would end suffering, which in turn would end feeling, which in turn would end all suffering [§§14-15]. The Buddha goes on to criticize the finer details of the Nirgranthas' wrong views of karma [§§16-20]. This is followed by the ten censurable points arising from the wrong beliefs of the Nirgranthas [§22].

1.2 THE FRUITS OF RECLUSHIP. §§23 right to the end contain the actual Dharma discourse, which begins with the Buddha's definition of the fruitful spiritual effort [§23a]. If one can push away craving, one's practice would be *pleasant and brings quick direct knowledge*. This is illustrated by the delightful parable of the lover which shows [§§23b-25] that "Dharma-inspired pleasure" actually helps in spiritual cultivation, so that one can either strive to overcome the source of suffering or to practise spiritual equanimity [§26]. For some practitioners, however, spiritual practice can be an uphill task, so that one's practice would be *painful with slow direct knowledge*. Such an effort is soberly illustrated by the parable of the fletcher [§27-29].

The remainder of the Sutta comprises of what is well known as **the fruit of recluship** (*sāmañña,phala*) schema. Here the schema begins with the statement of the presence of the Three Jewels in the world, and the possibility of spiritual renunciation and training [§§30-31]. This famous and ancient treatise on moral virtue or the set of "moralties" (*sīla*) [§32] forms the beginning section on "the fruit of recluship" (*sāmañña,phala*).¹⁵ The Deva,daha Sutta *sāmañña,phala* schema opens with only the "lesser moralities" (*cūla,sīla*) [§32], followed by mental development [§§33-41], the knowledge of supernormal powers [§§42-43], and the development of liberating wisdom [§§44-45].

The Sutta closes with the Buddha stating the positive version of the ten doubtful points (that characterize the Nirgrantha views), that is, the ten praiseworthy points [§46].

3 Three wrong views

The Devadaha Sutta has two key ideas: the first regarding karma, and the second regarding omniscience. The Sutta's first key idea—that what one now feels (pleasure, pain or neutral feeling) is merely due to what one did in the past [2-9]—is also found in **the Sīvaka Sutta**¹⁶ and **the Titt'h'āyatana Sutta**.¹⁷ The Buddha's response to this false view clearly shows that the dependent arising as he has taught it, is one that spreads over the three periods of time (past, present and future). The Devadaha Sutta (that is, its compilers) attributes this wrong view to the early Jains (the Nirgranthas), and here the Buddha shows the errors of such a view.

¹³ The view that everything is due to past karma (*pubbaka,hetu,vāda*) is often criticized and refuted in various ways by the Buddha: **Devadaha S** (M 101/2:214-223) where it is ascribed to the Jains, **Sīvaka S** (S 36.21/4:230f) & **Titt'h'āyatana S** (A 3.61/1:173 f). A formal refutation of *pubbala,hetu,vāda* is found **Kathā,vatthu** (Kvu 17.3/545 f = Kvu:SRD 314 f).

¹⁴ The nature of omniscience is discussed at length in eg **Sandaka S** (M 76) = SD 35.7.

¹⁵ The *sāmañña,phala* schema finds its best known expression in **Sāmañña,phala S** (D 2.39-98 /1:62-85) = SD 8.10. See Gethin 2001:195 f.

¹⁶ S 36.21/4:230 f = SD 5.6.

¹⁷ A 3.61/1:173-177 = SD 6.8.

In the **Tittih'āyatana Sutta**, the Buddha rebuts the following doctrines or notions:¹⁸

- (1) determinism (everything is due to past action) (*pubbe,kata,hetu*),
- (2) theism (everything is due to God) (*issara,nimmāna,hetu*), and
- (3) fatalism (no causality) (*ahetu,paccaya*).

If everything is deterministic—everything is due to past action—all actions will have predictable results. As such, we have an endless loop without any way out.

Similarly, in the case of fatalism, if things were predetermined or fated, then nothing can change them. In the case of either determinism or of fatalism, you will not need to improve yourself (since you are blessed with good luck) or there is no way you can improve yourself (as your fortune is fixed or predetermined). In such a scenario, there is no moral order, that is, to say, there is no true concern for one's own wellbeing nor that of others. Both determinism and fatalism can easily form a part of theism, that is, the God-idea.

These three notions—determinism, theism and fatalism—all fall under the category of “**the doctrine of non-action**” (*akiriya,vāda*). The Buddha's basic rebuttal is that if any of these three notions were true, then no one would be morally responsible for their commission and omission of deeds, and would then be likely to fall into the ten unwholesome course of action (*akusala kamma,patha*),¹⁹ that is, the breaking of the precepts through the three doors (body, speech and mind). In other words, people would commit bad deeds without a thought since there is no moral order.

4 The creator-God idea

4.1 MAN AND NATURE MARGINALIZED. The God-idea—if there is an all-powerful (omnipotent) being—will, as a rule, only work in a deterministic or fatalistic scenario, since (in this view) God has created everything and nothing happens without his will. In such an ideology, God comes first and foremost, with humanity (or more exactly, believers and “the chosen”) merely second, and all other things, such as non-believers, animals, non-humans and nature, relegated to the lowest levels, to be dominated by man (that is, the believers).

Furthermore, this world is merely a sort of preparation or testing-ground for God's heaven. However, the most pernicious characteristic of the God-idea is that those who claim their God to be the one and only true God, easily find a very good excuse for segregating and evangelizing (that is, colonizing) them, or worse, for persecuting and executing them. Understandably, such an ideology, in the hands of the politically powerful or those who have huge funds, can have widespread and devastating effects, as here morality is not defined as the common good, but as submission to God's will, so that whatever happens is regarded as God's will.

4.2 PROPHECY. Interestingly, prophecy, too, often plays an important role in God-religions. The rationale for a belief in prophecy is understandably that the world and life are predetermined by God. According to Jayatilleke,

If the future was wholly or partly determined, it should be possible to know this in some way or another, because the future exists in the same sense in which the present exists... , which was the *niyativādin's*²⁰ assumption... Nothing is knowable unless it is a fact; if the future is knowable it is a fact and this is not possible unless the future exists in some sense in or like the present—which is the determinist thesis. (1963:152)

The truth or reliability of prophecy is difficult to be scientifically tested and remains a matter of belief and faith. Many people, however, believe that certain prophecies have been fulfilled, especially if these

¹⁸ A 3.61.1-4/1:173 f = SD 6.8 Intro (1).

¹⁹ D 3:269, 290; A 5:264.

²⁰ A *niyatī,vādī* is one who believes in determinism or fatalism, as in the cases of Pūraṇa Kassapa and his view of non-action (*akiriya*) (D 1:53; cf *akiriya,vāda*, M 1:404 f), and of Makkhali Gosāla and causelessness (*ahetu,vāda*) (M 2:408) or “mere samsara” (*samsāra,suddhi*, D 1:53). See Jayatilleke 1963:143 f.

are central to their religion. Others consider that some apparently fulfilled prophecies can be explained as simple coincidences, or that some prophecies were actually invented after the fact to match the circumstances of a past event (*vaticinium ex eventum*, “prediction after the event” or “postdiction”).²¹ Theologically speaking, as a Bible scholar notes, “... the notion of *vaticinia ex eventus* itself, so often used to date apocalyptic texts, is really a quite problematic basis for interpretation, especially when one is dealing with a genre saturated with traditional motifs and symbols and preoccupied with *meaning* rather than *chronology*.”²² In other words, religiously significant events were put together for what the believers see as meaningful.

Most predictions from such figures as Nostradamus are deliberately written in a such a vague and ambiguous way as to make interpretation nearly impossible before the event, rendering them useless as predictive tools. After the event has occurred, however, details are *shoehorned*²³—moving the goalposts—into the prediction by the psychics or their believers using *selective thinking*²⁴—emphasize the hits, ignore the misses—in order to give credence to the prophecy and give the impression of an accurate “prediction.” Inaccurate or wrong predictions are simply not mentioned.

Believers generally feel that the problem lies not with the wording of the prediction, but with the interpretation—much the same argument used by supporters of religious texts—but this then elicits the question: “What is the point of a prediction that cannot be interpreted correctly before the event?”²⁵

4.3 BUDDHIST PROPHECY. The early Buddhist Suttas are generally without any prophetic statements, as the avowed purpose is that of liberation here and now. The only prophecy in the Dīgha Nikāya is that of the coming of the future Buddha Metteyya (Skt Maitreya), found in **the Cakka,vatti Sīha,nāda Sutta** (D 26), which was probably interpolated during Asokan times. The prophecy is then immediately followed by an admonition to practise the four focusses of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*).²⁶

Buddhist prophecy as presented in the early Suttas is characteristically *didactic*, although in due course popular Buddhism emphasized its *eschatological* aspect,²⁷ where the future Buddha is addressed as if he is already awakened (as “Ariya Metteyya” or “Arya Maitreya”).²⁸ Interestingly, **the Anāgata,bhaya Suttas 1-4** (A 5.77-80)—on “future fears” (*anāgata,bhaya*)—attributed to the Buddha himself, are actually admonitions that we exert ourselves here and now before we are faced with various hindrances.²⁹ **The Kimbila Suttas 1-3** (A 5.201, 6.40, 7.56) are concerned with the spirituality of the Sangha, basically warning what monastic should avoid in post-Buddha times.³⁰ The most dramatic prophecies (as far as Buddhist prophecy goes) are understandably addressed in connection **Mahā Kassapa**, who took upon

²¹ Example of Vedic postdiction: the ref alluding to Baitthā,sūkta (R̥gveda 1.141,1-3) as a prophecy heralding the arrival of Madhva as *amśvatāra* of Viṣṇu. None of the famous ancient Indian authors before him had dared to claim to be an incarnation of God (<http://www.istb.univie.ac.at/cgi-bin/sdn/sdn.cgi?detail=33>). It was their disciples who honoured and adored them as avatars. Examples of biblical postdiction incl: Joshua is name explicitly before his time! (1 Kings 13:2): this is perhaps the most glaring *vaticinium ex eventu* in the Bible; the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 CE is interpolated show an abrupt break in the narrative sequence (Matt 22:6 f); Mark 13:14, see H Detering, *Journal of Higher Criticism* 7,2 Fall 2000:181 f, www.hermann-detering.de/Mk13%20JHC.-pdf; the Roman siege of Jerusalem known to Luke is placed on Jesus’ lips as a prophecy (Luke 19:42-44, 21:20).

²² See <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/1998/1998-11-03.html>.

²³ See <http://www.skeptdic.com/shoehorning.html>.

²⁴ **Selective thinking** is the process by which one filters for favorable evidence to justify a belief or idea, and ignoring unfavorable evidence. Unlike “wishful thinking,” which is narrower, selective think does not need belief for a desirable result. In statistics, this tendency is called confirmation bias or selection bias.

²⁵ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaticinium_ex_eventu.

²⁶ D 26.25-27/3:75 f.

²⁷ See eg Jan Nattier, *Once upon a Future Time. Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline*, Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1991. Reviewed by Ria Kloppenborg, *Numen* 412 May 1994:208 f.

²⁸ See eg **Anāgata,vamsa** (by Mahā Kassapa of Nāgānana Vihāra, Coḷa, S India; 12-13th cent), ed J Minayeff, JTPS 1886; *Anāgatavamsa Desanā*, tr fr Sinhala by Udaya Meddegama (ed with intro & nn by JC Holt), 1993 (a short version of *Anāgata,vamsa*); and <http://www.budsas.org/ebud/metteya/arimet00.htm>.

²⁹ A 5.77-80/3:100-110: see **The Dharma-ending Age** = SD 1.10(3).

³⁰ **Kimbila S 1** (A 5.201/3:247), **Kimbila S 2** (A 6.40/3:339 f), **Kimbila S 3** (A 7.56/4:84).

himself to ensure the continuation of the purity of the Teaching after the Buddha's passing.³¹ The spirit behind all such early texts on Buddhist prophecy is that of making personal effort in the right way for liberation in this life itself.

5 Feeling: the Buddhist view

5.1 THE TYPE OF FEELING, NOT THE FEELING ITSELF. **Brahmavaṃso**, in his recorded teachings, gives a discerning and insightful analysis on feeling in connection with the Devadaha Sutta, and I reproduce his valuable teachings here.³² The Devadaha Sutta disproves the theory that *everything* that one feels now is due to what one did in a past life. The Buddha denies that everything that one feels—happiness, suffering, or neutral feeling—is due to what one did in a past life, that they are due to karma-formations of a past life. This should be obvious, as some of what one feels is caused by karma-formations; some caused by past karma-formations earlier in this life; and some caused by karma-formations being performed now. What the Buddha is denying is that *all* happiness or suffering or neutral feelings are caused by karma from a previous life.

It should be pointed out that the Buddha is here referring to *the type* of feeling, rather than to *feeling itself*. It is true that whichever one of the three types of feeling that one experiences, happiness or suffering or neutral, is not always due to karma from a past life. But it is also true that the situation whereby one can experience feeling at all, the fact that feeling (*vedanā*) exists, is due to karma from a past life.

A simile might make this clear. This situation that you possess a TV on a public holiday is due to your having purchased it on some previous day. Its presence, as it were, is due to karma from a past day. But whichever one of the three available channels that appears on the screen—Channel Happiness, or Channel Suffering, or Channel Neutral—is not always due to what you did on some previous day. The content is not at all due to what you did on some previous day: the content is not due to karma from the past.

In the same way, the Buddha states that the existence of feeling in this life is due to karma formations done in a³³ previous life. But this particular type of feeling—happiness, suffering or neutral feeling—is not always due to karma from a previous life.³⁴

5.2 FEELING AS THE ROOT OF VIEWS AND RELIGIONS. The Buddha's teaching gives a central place to *feeling* in explaining the nature of wrong views. Feelings arise not because of past action, but as an integral part of present action. There are also feelings that are karmically neutral, that is, neither morally active nor producing karmic result, since they are not rooted in greed, hate or delusion, such as the actions of the arhats.

Contact (*phassa*) and feeling (*vedanā*) are crucial to the formation of views (*diṭṭhi*), especially wrong views. They are the roots of all dogmas. In the “wisdom” section of **the Brahma-jāla Sutta** (D 1), the Buddha explains how the 62 grounds for wrong views arise from the “feeling of those who know not, merely the agitation and vacillation of those overcome by craving” (D 1.105-117). Applying the principle of dependent arising, the Buddha goes on to explain such ignorant reactions are in turn caused by contact (*phassa*), that is, through misunderstanding sense-experience (D 1.118-130). Without contact, none of those views would arise; they all arise through the constant contact in the six sense-spheres (D 1.131-143). All these are speculative views (*diṭṭhi-gata*), arising from feeling, binding them to the rounds of speculative views and of suffering (D 1.144).³⁵

³¹ **Ovāda S 1-3** (S 16.6-8/2:204-210) = SD 1.10(4); **Saddhamma Paṭirūpaka S** (S 16.13/2:224 f) = SD 1.10-(5c).

³² See *Dhamma Journal* 4,2 July 2003:66 f.

³³ Original text has “the.”

³⁴ Once the distinction is made between feeling (*vedanā*) and the contents of feeling (happiness, suffering or neutral), it is clear that **Tiṭṭh'āyatana S** (A 3.69) does not state that feeling is not caused by karma-formations from a previous life (A 3.61/1:173-177 = SD 6.8). This does not disprove that orthodox understanding of dependent arising as spanning tree lives: see **Dependent Arising** = SD 5.16 (10).

³⁵ D 1.105-144/1:40-45 = SD 25. See Sue Hamilton, *Identity and Experience*, 1996a:47 f.

5.3 FEELING AND THE GOD-IDEA. It is a lack of understanding of the true nature of feelings that misleads people into creating and believing in the God-idea, the most egotistical of religious ideas. When one subscribes to any *one* God-idea, one necessarily has to reject all other such notions, simply because to accept any other god or Gods would contradict the notion of a singular supreme being. The reality is that this is the ultimate quest for supremacy and power over others: the notion that one's God is the only true one, and all others false.

On a more mundane level, the God-idea provides an easy cop-out from clear thinking and personal effort with the notion that everything must have a beginning. A "beginning" is just a conceptual point that one chooses to talk about something. It is simply the poverty of one's thought not to understand that the universe and life (like a circle) have no beginning, that they are cyclic and evolutionary processes.

From all this, it is easy to see the roots of the creator-God idea: it is extremely difficult to understand the nature of feelings, much less how they work on our lives. Lacking this understanding, humans seek some external form of power to liberate them from life's vicissitudes due to feelings: joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, fear and courage, stress and relief, and so on.

Understandably, the Creator God idea, being deeply rooted in feeling, cannot be proven in any logical or scientific manner, and can only be sustained by "faith," that is, surrender and obedience to its official definition. Whoever defines God, as such, commands power over their believers.³⁶ What one does not understand, one often grasps by the wrong end, so that one suffers ignorance, craving and pain as a result.

5.4 FEELING AND CHANGE. In a philosophical sense, to say that something exists, immediately attributes change and impermanence to it. For nothing can exist except in change. If one says that God exists, then that God must necessarily be an impermanent being. Any creator God-idea is caught in such a double bind. If there were such a creator God, if he is in any way meaningful to us, he has to be impermanent. Otherwise, he does not exist.

Buddhism, however, sees the problem in an even more profound way. In **the Kaccā(ya)na,gotta Sutta** (S 12.15) the Buddha declares thus:

4 "This world, Kaccāna, mostly³⁷ depends upon a duality: upon [the notion of] existence and [the notion of] non-existence.³⁸

5 But for one who sees **the arising of the world**³⁹ as it really is with right wisdom, there is [the notion of] non-existence regarding the world.

And for one who sees **the ending of the world** as it really is with right wisdom, there is no notion of existence regarding the world.⁴⁰

6a This world, Kaccāna, is mostly bound by fixation [attachment], clinging and inclination.⁴¹

³⁶ An interesting and informative article here is Norman Council, "Christianity, capitalism, corporations, and the myth of dominion," 2004, downloadable from <http://www.doublestandards.org/text/council1.html>.

³⁷ "Mostly," *yebhuyyena*, here refers to the ordinary being, except for the noble saints (*ariya,puggala*) who hold on to the extreme notions of either something exists (*atthitā*) (eternalism, *sassata*) or does not exist (*natthitā*) (annihilationism, *uchcheda*) (SA 2:32). See foll n.

³⁸ Here, following Bodhi, I have rendered *atthitā* as "the notion of existence" and *n'atthitā* as "the notion of non-existence." See SD 6.13 Intro (2).

³⁹ On the tr of the terms *samudaya* and *nirodha* see Intro (3).

⁴⁰ The 2 sentences of this verse are the two extremes rejected by the Buddha in **Lokāyatika S** (S 12.48/2:77), including 2 more: that all is unity and that all is plurality. Comy: In terms of dependent arising, "the origin of the world" is the direct conditionality (*anuloma paccay'ākāra*), "the ending of the world" is the reverse conditionality" (*paṭiloma paccay'ākāra*). Here the world refers to formations (*sankhāra*). In reflecting on the direct-order dependent arising, (seeing the rise of phenomena) one does not fall into the notion of annihilationism; reflecting on the reverse dependent origination, (seeing the ending of phenomena) one does not fall into the notion of eternalism. (SA 2:33). The Buddha's teaching on the origin and ending of the world (in terms of the five aggregates) is found in **Loka S** (S 12.44/2:73 f).

⁴¹ "bound...adherence," PTS *upāy'upādānābhinivesa,vinibandha*, but preferred reading is Be Ce *upāy'upādānābhinivesa,vinibaddha* = *upāya* (attachment, fixation) + *upādāna* (clinging) + *abhinivesa* (inclination, mindset, adherence) + *vinibaddha* (bound, shackled) [alt reading *vinibandha*, bondage]. Comy: Each of the three—fixation,

6b But this person (with right view) does not engage in, cling to, incline towards that fixation and clinging, the latent tendency of mindset and inclination—he does not take a stand (that anything is) ‘my self’.⁴²

He has neither uncertainty nor doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing.⁴³ His knowledge about this is independent of others.⁴⁴

It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view.

7 ‘Everything is [all exists] (*sabbam atthi*),’⁴⁵ Kaccāna, this is one extreme. ‘Everything is not [all does not exist] (*sabbam n’atthi*),’ this is the second extreme.

(S 12.15.4-7/2:16 f) = SD 6.13

Up to the last century, scientific and academic thinking is generally held to be founded on the classic Aristotelian dichotomy: either something exists or it does not, p or –p.⁴⁶ If something is black, it cannot be white. This idea is theoretically best expressed in formal logic, which is wholly based on three propositions, which make up the basic Aristotelian syllogism:⁴⁷

- (1) the law of identity (“A” = “A”);
- (2) the law of contradiction (“A” is not “not-A”), and
- (3) the law of the excluded middle (“A” is not “B”).

For more than 2,000 years, this has been the corner-stone of all western logic. This was declared a dogma by the mediaeval church, and at the end of the 18th century, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant was able to say that logic, since Aristotle, had not made any step forward or any step back.

Yet the basic Aristotelian syllogism itself is based on a false premise. Although there appears to be a logical progression in the syllogism, it is only an illusion. All three assertions are, in fact, already found in the first one, “A” = “A.” Everything stands or falls with this “law of identity.” In simple terms, this system assumes that there is the universal truth that “A” is a constant, an entity: it does not change.

Based on such a notion, one then asserts that *a thing either exists or does not exist*, a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else, cause and effect stand opposed to one another. On a more sophisticated level, such ideas led the French Enlightenment philosopher **René Descartes** (1596-1650) to conclude “*cogito ergo sum*” (“I think therefore I am”)⁴⁸ or, more fully, “*dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum*” (Latin: “I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am”). This philosophical statement, although one that Des-

clinging, inclination [mindset]—arise by way of craving (*taṇhā*) and views (*dīṭṭhi*), for it is through these that one fixates to, clings to, inclines to the phenomena of the three spheres as “I” and “mine.” (SA 2:33). These three words appear to be syns or near-syns of latent tendencies, but I have rendered them in order of their subtlety (fixation, clinging, inclination [mindset]). See S:B 736 n31.

⁴² “But this... ‘My self’,” *tañ cāyam upāy’upādānam cetaso adhiṭṭhānam abhinivesānusayam na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhati “attā me” ti*. Comy: Craving and views are called “mental standpoint” (*cetaso adhiṭṭhana*) because they are the foundation for the (unwholesome) mind, and “the latent tendency of inclination [mindset],” or perhaps “inclination [mindset] and latent tendency” (*abhinivesānusaya*) because they stay to the mind and lie latent there (SA 2:33). This is a difficult sentence, and I am guided by the Sutta spirit than the letter. See S:B 736 n32. Cf **Hālidakāni S 1** (S 22.3.9/3:10) = SD 10.12.

⁴³ Comy: Suffering (*dukkha*) here refers to the 5 aggregates of clinging. What the noble disciple sees, when he reflects on his own existence, is not a self or a substantially existent person but only the arising and passing away of causal conditions (*paccay’uppanna,nirodha*) (of dependent arising). (SA 2:33). Cf **Selā**’s verses (S 548-551/1:134) & **Vajirā**’s verses (S 553-55/1:135).

⁴⁴ “Independent of others,” *apara-p,paccayā*. From streamwinning on, the noble disciple sees the truth of the Dharma by himself, and as such is not dependent on anyone else, not even the Buddha, for his insight into the Dharma. However, he may still approach the Buddha or an enlightened teacher for instructions and guidance in meditation until he attains liberation.

⁴⁵ On these two “notions,” see SD 6.13 Intro (2).

⁴⁶ On Aristotle’s logic, see eg <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/>.

⁴⁷ See Aristotle, *The Basic Works*, ed Richard Mckeon, Modern Library, 2001: see esp “Posterior Analytics” (in his *Organum*).

⁴⁸ In French: *Je pense, donc je suis*; found in *Discourse on Method* (French), 1637 part IV, & *Principles of Philosophy* (Latin), 1644 §7. For a contemporary discussion, see eg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum.

Cartes himself did not think worth pursuing, became a foundational element of Western philosophy, that is, until recent times.

Descartes, however, was very religious in his philosophy, and indeed argued that “*cogito ergo sum*” proved the existence of God. Later scholars noted the existence of the “Cartesian Other”: they asked “who is reading this sentence about thinking and being?”—and generally concluded that it must be God. Like the early Vedic philosophers of India, Descartes and many western philosophers (and religions) thought that some kind of abiding entity existed.

For the Buddha, however, as stated in **the Kaccā(ya)na,gotta Sutta** (S 12.15), to claim that something exists is one extreme of the spectrum; to say something does not exist is the other extreme. In fact, to say something exists is to imply stasis—the word becomes the thing. To refer to *existence*, the verbs to be (“is,” “are,” etc) are used. However, when I say, “This is a book,” I can at best refer to a certain fact (if it is one) at a certain point in time.

Since a book may appear not to change, except perhaps after a very long while, let us look at a more common example. Some might say, for example, “B is bad,” and so effectively condemns B to utter badness. The situation, however, is different when we say, “It is bad for B to rob a bank.”⁴⁹ (“It” here is simply what, in grammar, is called an “anticipatory it,” referring to an impersonal agency.)⁵⁰ Only when such dynamic situations are properly predicated, that is, attaching qualities to them that they make sense: we can talk about them and do things with them.

What does it mean to say something *is*? When we say something *is*, we are falsely separating it from the rest of reality. For example, if I say “B is black,” I mean that it is different from all non-black things. However, there is a problem here: “black” is only meaningful in relation to “non-black.” But the true reality is that there are countless shades and hues of grayness and other colours between black and non-black.

When we predicate something, we are giving it attributes, or putting it into a category: “a beautiful sunset,” “a kind person,” “a sweet smell,” “an ancient Indian text,” and so on. We have *defined* or *expressed* a certain idea in our minds, or *referred* to something in a certain way, but just because we define something does not mean that it exists (we cannot simply define something into existence), or that it is really what we think it is (we could be mistaken). It is merely a virtual reality, projected by words and ideas.

Understandably, nirvana is beyond any categorizing as existing or not existing, just as a scientist would say a “point” does not really exist, but is a convenient notion that helps in scientific thinking and exchange of ideas for furthering scientific knowledge. Similarly, whatever notions we have, should help us understand the true nature of reality so that it liberates us from suffering.

The greatest fear of those who do not understand the true nature of feeling is change. Seeing change working through birth, life, decay and death, they think life begins only at birth and ends at death. And since death seems to take away their lives, loved ones, possessions and pleasures, they fear death. Fearing change and death, they fabricate or believe in a creator-God who is eternal and life-giving. The point is that whatever exists, can only be either change or stasis; unless that state is beyond change and stasis—that is, nirvana.⁵¹

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⁴⁹ For a discussion on E-Prime language, which is referred to here, see *Saññā* = SD 17.4 (6.2).

⁵⁰ Karunadasa notes, in the English language, when we say, eg, “it rains” or “it thunders,” “we dichotomize a single process by the use of the word ‘it.’ In the same way, when we say, ‘I think,’ we tend to believe that there is an I-entity in addition to the process of thinking.” (1991:15)

⁵¹ See *Vedanā* = SD 17.3 esp (3).

The Discourse at Deva,daha

(M 101/2:214-228)

1 Thus have I heard.

At one time, the Blessed One was staying in Sakya country. There was a Sakya market town named Devadaha.

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, “Bhikshus!”

“Bhante!” the monks answered in assent.

Is everything due to past karma?

The Blessed One said this:

2 “There are, bhikshus, some recluses and brahmins who hold such a doctrine, such a view, thus, **‘Whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action.’**⁵² Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism,⁵³ and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma.⁵⁴

Without further flood of karma, there is the destruction of karma.

With the destruction of karma, there is the destruction of suffering.

With the destruction of suffering, there is the destruction of feeling.

With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.’

Thus, bhikshus, say the Nirgranthas.

3 Bhikshus, I would go to the Nirgranthas who say thus, and I would say:⁵⁵

‘Nirgrantha friends, is it true that you hold such a doctrine, such a view, thus, *whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted?*’

If, bhikshus, when asked thus, they admit, ‘Yes,’ then I would say this to them:

4 (1) ‘But, Nirgrantha friends, do you know whether you have existed in the past, that you have not not existed?’⁵⁶

‘No indeed, friend.’

(2) ‘Now, Nirgrantha friends, do you know whether you have done evil in the past, that you have not not done so?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

(3) ‘Now, Nirgrantha friends, do you know whether you have done such and such an evil in the past, that you have not not done so?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

(4) ‘Now, Nirgrantha friends, do you know that so much suffering are already exhausted, or that so much suffering remains to be exhausted, or that when so much suffering has been exhausted that all suffering would be exhausted?’ [215]

⁵² *Sabbaṃ taṃ pubbe,kata,hetu. Pubbe,kata,hetu*, lit “caused by what is done in the past.” See Intro (2).

⁵³ *Iti purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantībhāvā*. From here up to §5—the notion that all feelings are due to past actions—are similarly, but more strongly criticized, in **Cūḷa Dukkha-k,khandha S** (M 14.17-19/1:93) = SD 4.7.

⁵⁴ *Navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatim anavassavo* = M 1:93,7. “Flood of karma,” *anavassava* = *na* + *avassa-va* [ava + √SRU, to flow], lit “not overflowing with, not being overfilled by, not overwhelmed by.” *Avassava* thus has the same root as *āsava* (mental influx, canker), and is syn with *avassuta* [ava + √SRU], “leaking, letting in water; drenched, moist; esp in connection with sexual lust (eg V 4:213, 214, 220, 233); see CPD: *ava-ssuta*. Cf **Saṅcetanika S** (A 10.206/5:292-297) = SD 3.9 Intro (1.4).

⁵⁵ *Evaṃ vādāhaṃ bhikkhave, nigaṇṭhe upasaṅkamitvā evaṃ vadāmi*, lit “Bhikshus, having approached the Nirgranthas who speak thus, I say thus...” This is a good example of the simplicity of early Pali, which is colloquial and easy to the ear. However, in translation, the context clearly is the conditional or hypothetical mood.

⁵⁶ *Kiṃ pana tumhe āvuso nigaṇṭhā jānātha, ahuvamh’eva mayam pubbe, na nāhuvamhā ti*.

‘No indeed, friend.’

(5) ‘Now, Nirgrantha friends, do you right now know what the abandoning of the unwholesome states is and what the cultivation of the wholesome states is?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

5 IGNORANCE OF THE PAST. So, Nirgrantha friends, it seems that
you do not know whether you have existed in the past...,
you do not know whether you have done evil in the past...,
you do not know whether you have done such and such evil in the past...,
you do not right now know that so much suffering are already exhausted, or that so much suffering remains to be exhausted, or that when so much suffering has been exhausted that all suffering would be exhausted—

that being so, it is *not* fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare such a doctrine, such a view, thus, that

whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.

6 If, Nirgrantha friends,
you knew that you have existed in the past...,
you knew that you have done evil in the past...,
you knew that you have done such and such evil in the past...,
you knew that that so much suffering are already exhausted, or that so much suffering remains to be exhausted, or that when so much suffering has been exhausted that all suffering would be exhausted—

that being so, it is fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare such a doctrine, such a view, thus, that

whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... [216]... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.

The parable of the painful dart

7 Suppose, Nirgrantha friends, a man were wounded by a dart,⁵⁷ thickly smeared with poison, and because of the dart, he were to feel racking, piercing, sharp pains.⁵⁸ Then his friends and companions, his kinsmen and blood relatives, bring a physician who is a dart-remover⁵⁹ to treat him.

The dart-removing physician would cut around his wound’s opening with a knife,⁶⁰ and on account of the wound being cut open by the knife, he would feel racking, piercing, sharp pains.

The dart-removing physician would then probe for the dart with a probe,⁶¹ and on account of the probing, he would feel racking, piercing, sharp pains.

The dart-removing physician would then pull out the dart,⁶² and on account of the dart being pulled out, he would feel racking, piercing, sharp pains.

⁵⁷ *Salla*, sometimes rendered as “arrow” (*sara*). I’ve used “dart” which is also an archaic word for “arrow” (Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary). Apparently a dart is smaller than an arrow but still shot from a bow (*dhanu*).

⁵⁸ The first half of this simile of the poisoned dart is found in **Cūḷa Māluṅkyaputta S** (M 63.5b/1:429) = SD 5.8. The ending clause: *so sallassa’pi vedanā,hetu dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vediyeyya*, lit “caused by the feeling of the dart, too, he were to feel painful, racking, sharp feelings.”

⁵⁹ *Bhisakko salla,katto. Salla,katta*, “one who works on (removes) a dart.” The Buddha is said to be “an unsurpassed barb-remover” (Sn 560). The word is often tr as “surgeon” but which has a broader connotation than *salla,-katta*, which could also be rendered as “one who works with a dart” but still has a restricted sense than “surgeon.”

⁶⁰ *Tassa so bhisakko sallakatto satthena vaṇa,mukham parikanteyya.*

⁶¹ *Tassa so bhisakko sallakatto esaniyā sallam eseyya.*

⁶² *Tassa so bhisakko sallakatto sallam abbaheyya.*

The dart-removing physician would then apply medicinal powder on the wound's opening,⁶³ and on account of the medicinal powder being applied at the wound's opening, he would feel racking, piercing, sharp pains.

Then, in due course, when the wound has healed and is covered with skin, the man is well, happy, free, master of himself, going where he wishes. Now he might think:

'In the past, I was wounded by a dart, thickly smeared with poison, and because of the dart, I felt racking, piercing, sharp pains. Then my friends and companions, my kinsmen and blood relatives, brought a physician who was a dart-remover to treat me.

The dart-removing physician cut around my wound's opening with a knife,...

He then probed for the dart with a probe,...

He then pulled out the dart,...

He then applied medicinal powder on the wound's opening, and on account of (each of these), I felt racking, piercing, sharp pains.

But now [217] that the wound has healed and is covered with skin, I am well, happy, free, master of myself, going where I wish.'

8 KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST. Even so, Nirgrantha friends, if
you were to know that you have existed in the past...,
you were to know that you have done evil in the past...,
you were to know that you have done such and such evil in the past...,
you were to know that that so much suffering are already exhausted, or that so much suffering remains to be exhausted, or that when so much suffering has been exhausted that all suffering would be exhausted,

then, it is fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare such a doctrine, such a view, thus, that *whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action*. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.

9 But, Nirgrantha friends, since
you do not know that you have existed in the past...,
you do not know that you have done evil in the past...,
you do not know that you have done such and such evil in the past...,
you do not know that that so much suffering are already exhausted, or that so much suffering remains to be exhausted, or that when so much suffering has been exhausted that all suffering would be exhausted,
 then, it is not fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare such a doctrine, such a view, thus, that *whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action*.

Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.

The impossibility of omniscience

10 When this was said, the Nirgranthas said this to me:⁶⁴ [218]

'Friend, the Nirgrantha Nātaputta is all-knowing and all-seeing, and claims to have total knowledge and vision, thus:

"Whether I am walking, or standing, or sleeping, or awake, knowledge-and-vision is constantly and continually present [established] in me."

⁶³ *Tassa so bhisakko sallakatto agad'āṅgāraṃ vaṇa, mukhe odaheyya*. The cpd *agad'āṅgāra* = *agada* (medicine, antidote) + *āṅgāra* (charcoal, fiery charcoal, ember). Comy however gloss the cpd as *jhāma, harītakassa vā āmalakassa vā cunnaiṃ*, "burnt yellow myrobalan (Terminalia citrine or chebula) or emblic myrobalan (Phyllanthus emblica) powder" (MA 4:2,16).

⁶⁴ The Nirgrantha justify their notion of omniscience here by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's statement in **Cūḷa Dukkha-k, khandha S** (M 14.17/1:92 f) = SD 4.7. For the Buddha's rebuttal, see **Sandaka S** (S 76.21/1:519) = SD 35.7.

He said thus:

“There are, Nirgrantha friends, evil deeds you have done in the past: exhaust them with the performance of these racking painful works.⁶⁵ Here when you are restrained in body, restrained in speech, restrained in mind, you do no more evil. Thus by eliminating past action through asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma.

Without further flood of karma, there is the destruction of karma.

With the destruction of karma, there is the destruction of suffering.

With the destruction of suffering, there is the destruction of feeling.

With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.”

And we approve of this and accept it, and so we are satisfied.⁶⁶

The five doubtful points

11 When this was said, bhikshus, I spoke thus to the Nirgranthas:

‘There are five things, Nirgrantha friends, that may bear two kinds of results right here and now.⁶⁷

What are the five?

They are.⁶⁸

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) faith | (<i>saddhā</i>), |
| (2) personal preference | (<i>ruci</i>), |
| (3) repeated hearing | (<i>anussava</i>), |
| (4) specious reasoning [reasoned thought] | (<i>ākāra, parivittakka</i>), and |
| (5) being convinced [through acceptance of]
a view after pondering on it | (<i>diṭṭhi, nijjhāna-k, khanti</i>). |

These five things may bear two kinds of results here and now.

Here,

what kind of faith,

what kind of personal preference,

what kind of repeated hearing,

what kind of specious reasoning,

what kind of acceptance of a view after pondering on it,

do the venerable Nirgranthas have in a teacher who speaks about the past?’

Speaking thus, bhikshus, I do not see anything striking regarding their doctrine.⁶⁹

Pain arises from present stimulus

12 Furthermore, bhikshus, I spoke thus to the Nirgranthas:

‘What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? When there is intense undertaking, when there is intense striving, do you then feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion?⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Taṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkara, kārikāya nijjīretha.*

⁶⁶ *Tañ ca paṇ' amhākaṃ rucati c'eva khamati ca, tena c' amhā attamanā' ti.*

⁶⁷ That is, (1) it may be fully accepted through faith, etc, “yet it may be hollow, empty, false (*rittam tuccam musā*),” but (2) something else may not be fully accepted through faith, etc, “yet it may be true, real, unmistaken (*bhūtam taccham anaññathā*)”: see **Caṅkī S** (M 95.14/2:170 f = SD 21.15), (**Musīla**) **Kosambī S** (S 12.68/2:115-118), and **Atthi Nu Kho Pariyāya S** (S 35.153/4:138-140).

⁶⁸ This whole passage has a parallel (and with detailed discussion) in **Caṅkī S** (M 95.14/2:170 f) = SD 21.15. These 5 points are discussed in detail in Jayatilleke, 1963:812-188, 274-276. For a longer list of doubtful points, see **Kesa,puttiya S** (A 3.65/1:188-193) = SD 35.4.

⁶⁹ *Evaṃ, vādi kho ahaṃ bhikkhave, nigaṇṭhesu na kiñci saha, dhammikam vāda, paṭihāraṃ samanupassāmi.* The argument that begins here ends at §15b.

⁷⁰ *Yasmim hi vo samaye tibbo upakamma hoti tibbam padhānam, tibbā tasmim samaye opakkamikā dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vedīyetha.* “Due to the strain of the intense exertion,” *opakkamika*, sec der of *upakkama* + *ika*; cf BHS *aupakramika* (see BHSD): pertaining to, caused by infliction (of torture or punishment), used (1) as an epi-

But when there is no intense undertaking, when there is no intense striving, do you then feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the exertion?’

‘When there is intense undertaking, friend Gotama, when there is intense striving, then we feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion, [219] but when there is no intense undertaking, when there is no intense striving, then we do not feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion.’

13 ‘So it seems, Nirgrantha friends, when there is intense undertaking, friend Gotama, *when there is intense striving, then we feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion, but when there is no intense undertaking, when there is intense striving, then we do not feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion.*

That being the case, it is not fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare.⁷¹

‘Whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma.

Without further flood of karma, there is the destruction of karma.

With the destruction of karma, there is the destruction of suffering.

With the destruction of suffering, there is the destruction of feeling.

With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.”

Not everything is caused by past karma

14 If, Nirgrantha friends, when there is intense undertaking, when there is intense striving, racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion, are present, and when there is *no* intense undertaking, when there is *no* intense striving, the racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion are still present—then, that being the case, it would be *fitting* that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare:

“*whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted..*”

15a But, Nirgrantha friends, since when there is intense undertaking, when there is intense striving, you do feel the racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion, and when there is *no* intense undertaking, when there is *no* intense striving, you do not feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion—then, that being the case, it would *not* be fitting that the venerable Nirgranthas should declare:

“*whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma... With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted..*”

15b To the extent, Nirgrantha friends, that when there is intense undertaking, when there is intense striving, you do feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion, and when there is *no* intense undertaking, when there is *no* intense striving, you do not feel racking, piercing, sharp pains due to the strain of the intense exertion,

that you, indeed, feeling only the racking, piercing, sharp pains due to your own self-imposed strain of the intense exertion, through ignorance, unknowing, and delusion, [220] mistakenly hold, thus.⁷²

thet of painful feelings caused by torture or punishment inflicted upon a person by himself or others, and (2) as an epithet of one of the “afflictions” (*ābādha*): see CPD.

⁷¹ This thesis, first mentioned at §2 above, is not fitting (*kalla*) because their “intense striving,” ie their ascetic practice, is the cause of their painful feelings, as stated in §15.

⁷² *Te tumhe sāmāñ,ñeva opakkamikā dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vediyamānā avijjā aññānā sammohā vipaccetha.* Comy glosses *vipaccetha* as *viparītato saddahatha, vipallāsa-g.gahaṃ vā gaṇhathāti attho* (the meaning is that they believe mistakenly, they grasp (the idea) seized by perversion (MA 4:4).

“whatever this person feels—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral—all that is caused by past action. Thus, by eliminating past action by asceticism, and by doing no new action, there will be no further flood of karma...With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted..”

Speaking thus, bhikshus, I do not see anything striking regarding their doctrine.⁷³

[15b paraphrase: When you indulge in painful self-mortification, you *do* feel its painful effects; but when you do not do so, you do *not* feel any such effect. Therefore, you are mistaken in thinking that all feelings are caused by past action, and that asceticism would end such karma, which in turn would end suffering, which in turn would end feeling, which in turn would end all suffering. Such a mistake arises through ignorance.]

Wrong views about karma

16 Furthermore, bhikshus, I say thus to the Nirgranthas:

(1) ‘What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? Is it possible to say⁷⁴ of a karma [that is, its result] to be experienced here and now,⁷⁵ “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced *in the next life!*”?’⁷⁶

‘No indeed, friend.’

(2) ‘What about a karma to be experienced in the next life: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced *here and now* through exertion and striving!”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

17 Furthermore, bhikshus, I say thus to the Nirgranthas:

(3) ‘What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? Is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let a karma to be experienced as pleasant, through exertion and striving, be one to be experienced as *painful!*”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

(4) ‘What about a karma to be experienced as painful: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let a karma to be experienced as painful, through exertion and striving, be one to be experienced as *pleasant!*”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

18 (5) ‘What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? Is it possible to say, this karma that is to be experienced fully ripened,⁷⁷ “Through exertion and striving, let it *not* be experienced fully ripened!”^{78“?}

‘No indeed, friend.’

(6) ‘What about a karma that is not to be experienced fully ripened: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it *be* experienced as fully ripened!”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

19 (7) What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? Is it possible to say, this karma that [221] is to be experienced much,⁷⁹ “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced little!”^{80“?}

‘No indeed, friend.’

(8) ‘What about a karma that is to be experienced little: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced much!”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

⁷³ See §11 above..

⁷⁴ *Labham etan ti.*

⁷⁵ That is, a karma whose result is experienced in the present life.

⁷⁶ *Tam kin maññath’āvuso nigaṇṭhā, yam idam kammaṃ diṭṭha, dhamma, vedanīyaṃ, tam upakkamena vā padhānena vā samparāya, vedanīyaṃ hotū ti labham etan ti.*

⁷⁷ Comy: “To be experienced fully ripened” (*paripakka, vedanīya*)” simply refers to an action to be experienced here and now in a personality. However, it can also refer to a karma whose result is felt later on the same day, or within seven days. (MA 4:5).

⁷⁸ Comy: “Not be experienced fully ripened” (*aparipakka, vedanīya*)” simply refers to an action to be experienced in the next life (MA 4:5).

⁷⁹ “To be experienced much,” *bahu, vedanīya*. Comy glosses as “bringing one to a conscious existence” (*saññā, bhav’upagam*) (MA 4:9). AA glosses it as “giving many results” (*bahu, vipāka, dāyakam*, AA 4:175). See foll n.

⁸⁰ “Experienced little,” *appa, vedanīya*. Comy glosses it simply as “bringing one to a non-conscious existence” (*asaññā, bhav’upagam*) (MA 4:9). AA glosses it simply as “not giving many results” (*na bahu, vipāka, dāyakam*, AA 4:175). CPD: “to be suffered for but a little.”

20 (9) ‘What do you think, Nirgrantha friends? Is it possible to say, this karma that is to be experienced, “Through exertion and striving, let it be *not* experienced!”?’⁸¹

‘No indeed, friend.’

(10) ‘What about a karma that is not to be experienced: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it *be* experienced!”?’

‘No indeed, friend.’

21 SUMMARY. ‘So it seems, Nirgrantha friends,

- It is impossible to say of a karma [that is, its result] to be experienced here and now, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced in the next life!” or, to say of a karma to be experienced in the next life, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced here and now through exertion and striving!”
- It is impossible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let a karma to be experienced as pleasant, through exertion and striving, be one to be experienced as painful!” or, to say of a karma to be experienced as painful, “Through exertion and striving, let a karma to be experienced as painful, through exertion and striving, be one to be experienced as pleasant!”
- It is impossible to say, this karma that is to be experienced fully ripened, “Through exertion and striving, let it *not* be experienced fully ripened!”^{82c} or, to say of a karma that is not to be experienced fully ripened: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it *be* experienced as fully ripened!”
- It is impossible to say, this karma that is to be experienced much, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced little!” or, of karma that is to be experienced little: is it possible to say, “Through exertion and striving, let it be experienced much!”
- It is impossible to say, this karma that is to be experienced, “Through exertion and striving, let it be *not* experienced!” or, to say of a karma that is not to be experienced, “Through exertion and striving, let it *be* experienced!”

That being the case, fruitless is the exertion, [222] fruitless is the striving, of the venerable Nirgranthas!’

The ten censurable points

22 So, bhikshus, spoke the Nirgranthas. Such being what is spoken by the Nirgranthas, there are **ten justified [legitimate] grounds for censuring the Nirgranthas who speak such doctrines and dogmas**.⁸³

(1) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by what was done in the past (*pubbe, -kata, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Nirgranthas were *doers of bad karma in the past*, since they here and now feel such racking, piercing, sharp pains.

(2) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by a supreme God (*issara, nimmāṇa, -hetu*),⁸⁴ then, bhikshus, the Nirgranthas must surely have been *created by an evil supreme God*, since they here and now feel such racking, piercing, sharp pains.

⁸¹ This is a rare allusion to a karma that finds not opportunity to fruit and as such is defunct, what the Abhidhamma and Commentaries call “lapsed karma” or “defunct karma” (*ahosi, kamma*), which the **Paṭisambhidā, -magga** explains as: “There has been (*ahosi*) karma, there has been no karma-result, there will be no karma-result” (Pm 2:78). This non-existent karma usu refers to the actions of an arhat. (Vism 19.14/601; Abhs:BRS 5.20/205)

⁸² Comy: “Not be fully experienced” (*aparipakka, vedanīya*)” simply refers to an action to be experienced in the next life (MA 4:5).

⁸³ *Evam, vādi bhikkhave, niganthā evam, vādīnam bhikkhave niganthānam dasa saha, dhammikā vādānūvādā gārayham thānam āgacchanti*. The phrase *saha, dhammikā vādānūvādā gārayham thānam āgacchanti* is stock: D 1:161, 3:115; M 1:482, 2:127, 222, 3:77; S 2:33, 36, 3:6, 4:51, 340, 381, 5:6; A 1:161. The positive counterpart of this passage is at §46 (qv).

⁸⁴ The theist doctrine is criticized by the Buddha in **Titth’āyatana S** (A 3.61.3/1:174) = SD 6.8.

(3) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are circumstantial [caused by circumstance and nature] (*saṅgati, bhāva, hetu*),⁸⁵ then, bhikshus, the Nirgranthas must surely have *bad luck*,⁸⁶ since they here and now feel such racking, piercing, sharp pains.

(4) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by class [being reborn in a certain social class] (*abhijāti, hetu*),⁸⁷ then, bhikshus, the Nirgranthas must surely *belong to a bad class*, since they here and now feel such racking, piercing, sharp pains.

(5) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now (*diṭṭha, dhamm-ūpakkama, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Nirgranthas must surely *be striving badly here and now*, since they here and now feel such racking, piercing, sharp pains.

(6) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now, then, the Nirgranthas *are to be censured*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by striving here and now, the Nirgranthas *are (still) to be censured*.

(7) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by a supreme God, [223] then, the Nirgranthas *are to be censured*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by a supreme God, the Nirgranthas *are (still) to be censured*.

(8) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are circumstantial [caused by circumstance and nature], then, the Nirgranthas *are to be censured*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* circumstantial, the Nirgranthas *are (still) to be censured*.

(9) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by class [being reborn in a certain social class], then, the Nirgranthas *are to be censured*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by class, the Nirgranthas *are (still) to be censured*.

(10) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now, then, [223] the Nirgranthas *are to be censured*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by striving here and now, the Nirgranthas *are (still) to be censured*.

So speak the Nirgranthas. Such being what is spoken by the Nirgranthas, there are these ten justified [legitimate] grounds for censuring the Nirgranthas who speak such doctrines and dogmas.

Thus, too, bhikshus, fruitless is the exertion, fruitless is the striving!

THE SPIRITUAL TRAINING

Fruitful effort

23a And how, bhikshus, is **the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful?**

⁸⁸Here, bhikshus, a monk does not ever trap the untrapped self with suffering,⁸⁹ and he does not give up Dharma-inspired pleasure. And he does not cling to that pleasure.⁹⁰ He knows thus:

‘When I make determined effort,⁹¹ there is the fading away⁹² of this source of suffering in me on account of determined effort. And⁹³ when I look on at this source of suffering in me, there is the fading away of this source of suffering on account of the cultivation of equanimity.’⁹⁴

⁸⁵ This alludes to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla, criticized at length in **Apaṇṇaka S** (M 60.21-28/1:407-410) = SD 35.5. The **Cha-ḷ-abhijāti S** (A 6.57/3:383 f) lists the 6 classes according to the antinomian Pūraṇa Kassapa’s view: see also **Sāmañña,phala S** (D 2.19/1:53) = SD 8.10. This wrong view is briefly in **Titth’āyatana S** (A 3.61.4/1:175) = SD 6.8. See also Bodhi, *Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship*, 1989:73-75.

⁸⁶ *Pāpa, saṅgātika*.

⁸⁷ This doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla is mentioned in **Sāmañña,phala S** (D 2.20/1:53) = SD 8.10.

⁸⁸ *Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu na h’eva anaddha, bhūtaṃ attānaṃ dukkhena addha, bhāveti dhammikaṃ ca sukhaṃ na pariccajati*. On beneficial pleasure of meditation, see **Mahā Saccaka S** (M 36.30/1:246) = SD 1:12. See foll n.

⁸⁹ The “self” (*atta*) here and throughout this Sutta is the “didactic self” used in exhortation (spiritual education), not to any notion of an abiding self: see **Is there a Soul?** = SD 2.16(11).

⁹⁰ *Tasmiṃ ca sukhe anadhimucchito hoti so evaṃ pajānāti*. This is an allusion to the “middle way,” ie, noble eightfold path, which avoids the extremes of self-indulgence in sense-pleasures or in self-mortification: see **Dhamma, cakka-p, pavattana S** (S 56.11/5:420-424) = SD 1.1. See prec n.

⁹¹ “Because of determined effort,” *saṅkhāraṃ padahato*, where *saṅkhāra* means “effort, striving”: see **Saṅkhāra** = SD 17.6(5) meaning (5). Here I follow M:ÑB tr.

Pleasant progress, quick direct knowledge

23b So therein he makes determined effort: as he makes determined effort with regards to that source of suffering, there is fading away (of suffering) on account of that determined effort.⁹⁵ So therein he cultivates equanimity: as he looks on at that source of suffering, there is fading away (of suffering) on account of the cultivation of equanimity.⁹⁶

When he makes the determined effort, there is the fading away of that source of suffering in him on account of the effort of striving. And when he looks on at the source of suffering in him, there is the fading away of that source of suffering on account of the cultivation of equanimity.

Thus that suffering is exhausted in him.

24 SIMILE OF THE LOVER. Suppose, bhikshus, a man loves a woman with all his heart, his mind bound to her by intense passion and intense thoughts.⁹⁷ He might see that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing.⁹⁸

What do you think, bhikshus, would sorrow, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair arise in that man seeing see that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing or not?

‘Yes, he would, bhante. What is the reason for that? That man loves the woman with all his heart, his mind bound to her by intense passion and intense thoughts. [224] Therefore, sorrow, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair would arise in that man, seeing that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing.’

25 Then, bhikshus, this might occur to that man:

‘I love the woman with all my heart, my mind bound to her by intense passion and intense thoughts. Therefore, sorrow, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair would arise in that man, seeing that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing. What now if I abandon that desire and lust for that woman?’

So he abandons that desire and lust for the woman. Then, on another occasion, he might see might see that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing.

What do you think, bhikshus? What do you think, bhikshus, would sorrow, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair arise in that man seeing see that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing or not?’

‘No, he would, bhante. What is the reason for that? That man has no more desire for the woman. Therefore, sorrow, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair would not arise in that man, seeing that woman standing with another man, chatting, joking and laughing.’

26 ‘Even so, bhikshus, a monk does not ever trap the untrapped self with suffering, and he does not give up Dharma-inspired pleasure. Yet, he does not cling to that pleasure. He knows thus:

“When I make determined effort, there is the fading away of this source of suffering in me on account of determined effort. And when I look on at this source of suffering in me, there is the fading away of this source of suffering on account of the cultivation of equanimity.”

⁹² Comy identifies this “dispassion” or “fading away” (*virāga*) of suffering with “the path” (*magga*) (ie the supramundane path or the attainment of sainthood) (MA 4:12).

⁹³ *Pana.*

⁹⁴ *Imassa kho me dukkha, nidānassa saṅkhāraṃ padahato saṅkhāra-p, padhānā virāgo hoti. Imassa pana me dukkha, nidānassa ajjupekkhato upekkham bhāvayato virāgo hoti ti.* Comy explains the source of suffering as craving (*taṇhā*), so called because it is the root of suffering in the form of the 5 aggregates (*pañca-k, khandha*) (MA 4:12). This passage show two alternative way of overcoming craving: by personal effort in mindfulness, or by letting go through detachment (ie equanimity). This is a difficult passage: see M:H 3:xii.

⁹⁵ *So yassa hi khvāssa dukkha, nidānassa saṅkhāraṃ padahato saṅkhāra-p, padhānā virāgo hoti, saṅkhāraṃ tattha padahati.*

⁹⁶ *Yassa pan’assa dukkha, nidānassa ajjupekkhato upekkham bhāvayato virāgo hoti, upekkham tattha bhāveti.* Comy says that this passage illustrates an example of one whose progress is pleasant with quick direct knowledge (*sukha, paṭipadā khippābhīññā*) (MA 4:15): see (**Vitthāra**) **Paṭipadā S** (A 4.162.4/2:150) = SD 18.3 & Intro.

⁹⁷ *Seyyathā’pi bhikkhave puriso itthiyā sār’atto paṭibaddha, citto tibba-c, chando tibbāpekkho.*

⁹⁸ *So tam itthim passeyya aññena purisena saddhim santiṭṭhantim sallapantim sañjagghantim samhasantim.*

So therein he makes determined effort: as he makes determined effort with regards to that source of suffering, there is fading away (of suffering) on account of that determined effort. So therein he cultivates equanimity: as he looks on at that source of suffering, there is fading away (of suffering) on account of the cultivation of equanimity.

When he makes the determined effort, there is the fading away of that source of suffering in him on account of the effort of striving. [225] And when he looks on at the source of suffering in him, there is the fading away of that source of suffering on account of the cultivation of equanimity.

Thus that suffering is exhausted in him.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

Painful progress, slow direct knowledge

27 Furthermore, bhikshus, a monk considers thus:

‘While I live as I please, unwholesome states increase in me, wholesome states diminish. But when I exert myself, unwholesome states diminish and wholesome states increase. What now if I were to exert myself in what is painful? And he exerts himself in what is painful.’ On account of his exerting himself in what is painful, unwholesome states diminish and wholesome states increase.⁹⁹

Then in due course, he does not exert himself in what is painful. What is the reason for that?

The purpose for which he had exerted himself in what is painful has been achieved. Therefore, in due course, he does not exert himself in what is painful.¹⁰⁰

28 THE SIMILE OF THE FLETCHER. Suppose, bhikshus, a fletcher were warming and firing an arrow shaft between two flames, making it straight and workable. When the arrow shaft has been warmed and fired between the two flames and had been made straight and workable, he would not again later make it straight and workable.

What is the reason for that? The purpose for which the fletcher had warmed and fired the arrow shaft and make it straight and workable has been achieved. Therefore, in due course, he would not again warm and fire the arrow shaft and make it straight and workable.

29 Even so, bhikshus, a monk considers thus:

‘While I live as I please, unwholesome states increase in me, wholesome states diminish. But when I exert myself, unwholesome states diminish and wholesome states increase. What now if I were to exert myself in what is painful? And he exerts himself in what is painful.’

On account of his exerting himself in what is painful, unwholesome states diminish and wholesome states increase.

Then in due course, he does not exert himself in what is painful. [226] What is the reason for that?

The purpose for which he had exerted himself in what is painful has been achieved. Therefore, in due course, he does not exert himself in what is painful.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

ENDING OF THE ROUND OF BIRTHS¹⁰¹

Turning to the Dharma

30 Furthermore, bhikshus, there arises in this world the Tathāgata [Thus Come], an arhat, fully self-awakened, accomplished in knowledge and conduct, well-gone, knower of the worlds,¹⁰² unexcelled trainer of tamable persons, teacher of beings human and divine, awakened, blessed.

⁹⁹ This passage serves as a locus classicus for the Buddha’s permitting the ascetic practices (*dhutaṅga*) amongst the monks, ie, the proper use of austerities helps in overcoming defilements. In themselves, however, they do not reduce past karma or purify the “soul,” as held by the Nirgranthas and other sects. On the 13 ascetic practices, see **Bakkula S** (M 124.9-36/3:126 f) = SD 3.15 & Introd (2).

¹⁰⁰ Comy says that this passage shows an example of one whose progress is painful, with slow direct knowledge (*dukkha.paṭipadā dandhābhīṇā*) (MA 4:15): see (**Vitthāra**) **Paṭipadā S** (A 4.162.2/2:149) = SD 18.3 & Introd.

¹⁰¹ This section here [30-45] is as in **Kandaraka S** (M 51/1:339-349 = SD 32.9).

Having realized by his own direct knowledge this world with its gods, its Māras [evil ones], and its Brahmās [high gods], this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its rulers¹⁰³ and people, he makes it known to others. He teaches the Dharma, good in its beginning, good in its middle, good in its end, endowed with meaning and phrasing. He proclaims the holy life that is entirely complete and pure.

31 A householder or householder's son, hearing the Dharma, gains faith¹⁰⁴ in the Tathāgata and reflects:

‘The household life is stifling, a dusty path. The life of renunciation is like the open air. It is not easy living in a house to practise the holy life completely, in all its purity, like a polished conch-shell. What if I were to shave off my hair and beard, put on the saffron robes, and go forth from the household life into homelessness?’

So after some time he abandons his wealth, great or small,¹⁰⁵ and his circle of relatives, large or small, shaves off his hair and beard, puts on the saffron robes, and goes forth from the household life into homelessness.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

(A) MORAL VIRTUE

THE LESSER SECTION ON MORAL VIRTUE¹⁰⁶

Purity of body

32 He is thus one gone forth and possessing the monk's training and way of life:

(1) Having abandoned the destruction of life, he abstains from destroying life. He dwells with rod and weapon laid down, conscientious,¹⁰⁷ merciful, compassionate for the welfare of all living beings.

(2) Having abandoned the taking of the not-given, he abstains from taking what is not given. He takes only what is given, accepts only what is given, lives not by stealth but by means of a pure mind.

(3) Having abandoned incelibacy, he lives a celibate life,¹⁰⁸ living apart, refraining from the sexual act, the way of the village.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² Comy mentions the 3 worlds—that of space (*okāsa*), that of beings (*satta*), that of formations (*saṅkhāra*)—and says that here, the world of beings (*satta, loka*) is meant (Vism 7.37/204 f; DA 1:173 f; MA 1:397, 2:200). For details, see **Rohitassa S** (S 2.26/1:61 f) in SD 7.1 Introd.

¹⁰³ *Deva*, here in the sense of “devas by convention” (*sammati, deva*), ie kings. The other 2 types of *deva* are “gods by rebirth” (*upapatti, deva*) and “gods by purification” (*visuddhi, deva*), ie the Buddhas, Pratyeka Buddhas and arhats. (NC 307 KhA 123).

¹⁰⁴ “Faith,” *saddhā*. There are 2 kinds of faith (*saddhā*): (1) “rootless faith” (*amūlaka, saddhā*), baseless or irrational faith, blind faith. (M 2:170); (2) “faith with a good cause” (*ākāravati, saddhā*), faith founded on seeing (M 1:320, 8 401, 23); also called *avecca-p, pasāda* (S 12.41.11/2:69). “Wise faith” is syn with (2). *Amūlaka* = “not seen, not heard, not suspected” (V 2:243 3:163 & Comy). **Gethin** speaks of two kinds of faith: the cognitive and the affective (eg ERE: Faith & Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, 1963:387): “Faith in its cognitive dimension is seen as concerning belief in propositions or statements of which one does not—or perhaps cannot—have knowledge proper (however that should be defined); cognitive faith is a mode of knowing in a different category from that knowledge. Faith is its affective dimension is a more straightforward positive response to trust or confidence towards something or somebody...the conception of *saddhā* in Buddhist writings appears almost, if not entirely affective, the cognitive element is completely secondary.” (Gethin 2001:207; my emphases).

¹⁰⁵ On the accumulation of wealth, cf **Mahā Parinibbāna S** (D 16.1.23-24/2:85 f).

¹⁰⁶ This section [33] is the first of three comprising “the moralities” (*sīla*) that occur almost verbatim (fully or as excerpts) in all of the first 13 suttas and may once have formed a separate “tract” (D:RD 1:3 n1). This first section (*cūla, sīla*) is as at **Brahma, jāla S** (D 1.8-27/1:4-11), **Mahā Taṇhā, saṅkhaya S** (M 37.33-39/1:267-270) = SD 7.10; cf **Sāleyyaka S** (M 41.7-14/1:287), **Kandaraka S** (M 51.14-19/1:345-7), **Cha-b, bisodhana S** (M 112.13-17/3:33-36); also A 2:208, 4:249; Pug 56. See Gethin 2001: 195 f. This whole moral virtue section forms the first part of the full *sāmañña, phala* (fruits of recluseship) passage: see **Sāmañña, phala S** (D 2) = SD 8.10 Introd 3.

¹⁰⁷ *Lajjī*, “feeling ashamed, modest,” explain in the Comy on S 1:73 as “one who has moral shame (*hiri*) and moral fear (*ottappa*).” Opp *alajjī*, shameless.

¹⁰⁸ *Brahma, cariya* is the supreme conduct or holy life, ie celibacy. Dīgha Comy points out that it involves refraining from other forms of erotic behaviour besides intercourse (DA 1:73).

Purity of speech

(4) Having abandoned false speech, he abstains from false speech. He speaks the truth, the truth is his bond,¹¹⁰ trustworthy, reliable, no deceiver of the world.¹¹¹

(5) Having abandoned divisive speech he abstains from divisive speech. What he has heard here he does not tell there to break those people apart from these people here. What he has heard there he does not tell here to break these people apart from those people there.¹¹²

Thus reconciling those who have broken apart or consolidating those who are united, he loves concord, delights in concord, enjoys concord, speaks things that create concord.

(6) Having abandoned harsh [abusive] speech, he abstains from harsh speech. He speaks words that are humane, soothing, loving, touching, urbane, and delightful and pleasant to the multitude.

(7) Having abandoned idle chatter, he abstains from idle chatter. He speaks in season, speaks what is true, what is in accordance with the goal [or, what is beneficial].¹¹³ He speaks on the Dharma [Teaching]¹¹⁴ and the Vinaya [Discipline].¹¹⁵ He speaks words worth treasuring, seasonable, backed by reason, measured, connected with the goal.¹¹⁶

General

(8) He abstains from damaging seeds and plant life.¹¹⁷

Novice's precepts 6-10

(9) He eats only once a day, refraining from the evening meal and from food at improper times.¹¹⁸

(10) He abstains from dancing, singing, music and from watching shows.¹¹⁹

(11) He abstains from wearing garlands and from beautifying himself with scents and make-up.¹²⁰

(12) He abstains from high and luxurious beds and seats.¹²¹

(13) He abstains from accepting gold and silver [money].¹²²

General

(14) He abstains from accepting uncooked grain;

¹⁰⁹ *Gāma, dhamma*, ie the way of the householder, vulgar (in the sense of being associated with the masses) (MA 2:206 = DA 1:72).

¹¹⁰ “The truth is his bond,” *sacca, sandha*. Comy glosses as *saccena saccam sandahati*, “he joins truth with truth” (MA 1:206 = DA 1:73).

¹¹¹ This verse as in **Lakkhaṇa S** (D 30.2.16/3:170).

¹¹² This verse as in **Sāleyyaka S** (M 41.9/1:286 f) & **Sevitabbāsevitabba S** (M 114.6/3:49).

¹¹³ *Attha, vādī*. That is, he speaks about what is connected with the spiritual goal here and now, and hereafter (MA 2:208; DA 1:76).

¹¹⁴ He speaks on the 9 supramundane things (*nava lok'uttara, dhamma*) (MA 2:208 = DA 1:76), ie the 4 paths, 4 fruitions, nirvana (Dhs 1094).

¹¹⁵ The discipline of restraint (*saṃvara*) [of the senses] and of letting go (*pahāna*) [of defilements] (MA 2:208 = DA 1:76).

¹¹⁶ *Attha, saṃhitam*.

¹¹⁷ Curiously, this replaces the precept against intoxicants, which is omitted. As at D 1:10. On *bija, gāma, bhūta, gāma*, see Pāc 11 (V 4:34); see also D 1:5; MA 2:208. It is interesting to note that the early monastics respect not only sentient life, but also plant life. For this reason, the early monastics neither cook nor grow their own vegetables, but totally depend on “available” (*pavatta*) almsfood (whether meat or vegetables).

¹¹⁸ “Improper times” here means between noon and the following dawn (V 1:83, 4:86); cf S 5:470; A 1:212; Kvu 2.6.

¹¹⁹ A *dukkata* (wrong-doing) offence for monks (V 2:108); a *pācittiya* for nuns (V 4:267). Cf D 1:6, Kvu 2.7.

¹²⁰ Cf Kvu 2.8.

¹²¹ See Pāc 87; V 1:192, 2:163; D 1:7; A 1:181. Comy says that the “high beds” are those that exceed the prescribed measurements and the “large beds” are those that are not allowable (MA 2:209).

¹²² See Nissagīya 18 (V 3:236 ff); Kvu 2.10. For detailed discussion, see “Money and Monastics” (essay) in SD 4.19-23.

- (15) He abstains from accepting raw meat.¹²³
 (16) He abstains from accepting women and girls.
 (17) He abstains from accepting male and female slaves.
 (18) He abstains from accepting goats and sheep.
 (19) He abstains from accepting fowl and pigs.
 (20) He abstains from accepting elephants, cattle, horses, and mares.
 (21) He abstains from accepting fields and lands [landed property].¹²⁴
 (22) He abstains from running messages [or errands].¹²⁵
 (23) He abstains from buying and selling.
 (24) He abstains from dealing with false scales, false metals,¹²⁶ and false measures.¹²⁷
 (25) He abstains from bribery, deception, and fraud.
 (26) He abstains from wounding, executing, imprisoning, highway robbery, plunder, and violence.¹²⁸

(B) MENTAL CULTIVATION

Contentment

33 He is content with robes to protect his body and with almsfood to maintain his belly, and wherever he goes he sets out only with these¹²⁹ with him.

Here, just as a bird, wherever it goes, flies with its wings as its only burden, so, too, he is content with robes to protect his body¹³⁰ and with almsfood to maintain his belly, and wherever he goes, he takes only these with him.¹³¹

Possessing this aggregate of noble virtue, he experiences within himself a joy that is undefiled.¹³²

Sense-restraint

34¹³³ When he sees a form with the eye, **he grasps neither its sign nor its detail**, insofar as he dwells unrestrained in that eye-faculty so that the evil, wholesome states of covetousness and displeas-

¹²³ “Raw meat.” See V 3:208 where the nun Uppala.vaṇṇā prepares or roasts meat before offering to the Buddha.

¹²⁴ The Buddha however accepted land from rajahs like Bimbisāra and Pasenadi, and others like Anāthapiṇḍika and Visākhā, which were all received in the name of the Sangha. What is connoted here is accepting land on a personal basis.

¹²⁵ “Running messages.” See D 1:8; S 3:239.

¹²⁶ “False metals,” *kaṁsa, kūṭa*. See Nun’s Nis 11, 12 & n at V:H 3:230. Comy however says that *kaṁsa* refers to a bronze bowl with a veneer of golden colour presented as a golden bowl to mislead others. (MA 2:210 = DA 1:79).

¹²⁷ Comys mention 3 methods: *hadaya, bheda* (“heartbreak”), used in measuring ghee, oil, etc; *sikhā, bheda* (“heap break”), used in measuring sesamum, husked rice, etc; *rajju, bheda* (“cord break”), used in measuring fields and sites (MA 2:210 = DA 1:79). *Sikhā* refers to a pyramid-shaped heap of grain on a tray of prescribed measurements.

¹²⁸ Dīgha Comy says that they kidnap victims by hiding in the snow and by hiding in a thicket (DA 1:80).

¹²⁹ “These,” ie the 8 requisites (*aṭṭha parikkhāra*): a small razor (*khuddaka, vāsi*), needle (*sūci*), water-strainer (*parissāvana*), almsbowl (*patta*) with a shoulder-strap, the triple robe (*ti, cīvara*), belt (*kāya, paṭibandha*) (MA 2:213 = DA 1:297; DA 1:206 = J 1:65; DhA 2:61; J 4:342, 5:254). Explained in detail at DA 1:206 f.

¹³⁰ As in **Sāmañña, phala S** (D 2.66/1:71).

¹³¹ This whole section (Contentment) up to here as in “the mental development” section of **Sāmañña, phala S** (D 2.66/1:71).

¹³² *So iminā ariyena indriya saṁvarena samannāgato ajjhataṁ abyāseka, sukhaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti*. Cf **Sāmañña, phala S** (D 2.63/1:70).

¹³³ This whole para: *So cakkhunā rūpaṁ disvā na nimitta-g, gāhī hoti nānuyyañjana-g, gāhī. Yatvādhikaraṇaṁ enaṁ cakkhundriyaṁ asaṁvutaṁ viharantaṁ abhijjhā, domanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṁ, tassa saṁvarāya paṭipajjati, rakkhati cakkhundriyaṁ, cakkhundriye saṁvaraṁ āpajjati*. On *Na nimitta-g, gāhī hoti nānuyyañjana-g, gāhī*, lit “he is not one who grasps at a sign, he is not one who grasps at a detail (feature),” see SD 19.14. Comys say that “**sign**” (*nimitta*) here refers to a grasping arising through one’s sensual lust (*chanda, rāga, vasena*) or

ure¹³⁴ might overwhelm him, to that extent, he therefore keeps himself restrained. He practises the restraint of it. He guards the restraint of the eye-faculty, he commits himself to the restraint of the eye-faculty.

When he hears a sound with <u>the ear</u> ,...	He...has restraint of <u>the ear-faculty</u> .
When he smells a smell with <u>the nose</u> ,...	He...has restraint of <u>the nose-faculty</u> .
When he tastes a taste with <u>the tongue</u> ,...	He...has restraint of <u>the tongue-faculty</u> .
When he feels a touch with <u>the body</u> ,...	He...has restraint of <u>the body-faculty</u> .

When he cognizes a mind-object with the mind, **he grasps neither its sign nor its detail**, insofar as he dwells unrestrained in that mind-faculty so that covetousness and displeasure, evil unwholesome states, might overwhelm him, to that extent, he therefore keeps himself restrained. He practises the restraint of it. He guards the restraint of the mind-faculty, he commits himself to the restraint of the mind-faculty.¹³⁵

Full awareness

35 When going forward and returning, he acts with full awareness.¹³⁶

When looking toward and looking away....

When bending and extending his limbs....

When carrying his outer robe, his upper robe, and his bowl....

When eating, drinking, chewing, and tasting....

When voiding and peeing....

When walking, while standing, while sitting, while asleep, while awake, while talking, and while remaining silent, he acts with full awareness.

Possessing this aggregate of noble full awareness, he experiences within himself a joy that is undefiled.

on account of merely one's view (*diṭṭhi,matta,vasena*); “**detail**” (*anuvyañjana*) here refers to finding delight by grasping at another's limb or body part (eyes, arms, legs, etc) (Nm 2:390; Nc 141, 141; DhsA 400, 402; cf MA 1:75, 4:195; SA 3:4, 394; Nc 1:55; DhA 1:74). On other meanings of *nimitta*, see SD 13 §3.1a.

¹³⁴ “Covetousness and displeasure,” *abhijjhā,domanassaṃ*, which Walshe (1995:335 & n632) renders as “hankering and fretting for the world”; alt tr “covetousness and displeasure” or “longing and loathing.” MA says that longing and displeasure signify the first two hindrances—sensual desire and ill will—principal hindrances to be overcome for the practice to succeed. They thus represent the contemplation of mind-objects, which begins with the five hindrances. Cf M 1:274/39.13; see also **Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S** (D 22.13) and **Satipaṭṭhāna S** (M 10.36) on how to deal with the hindrances in one's meditation. The monk effects the abandoning of the hindrances by the contemplations of impermanence, fading away (of lust), cessation (of suffering) and letting go (of defilements), and thus comes to look upon the object with equanimity. On *abhijjhā,domanassa*, there is an interesting related passage from **Pubba or Pubb'eva Sambodha S** (A 3.101): “Bhikshus, before my enlightenment, when I was still a bodhisattva, this thought occurred to me... ‘Whatever physical and mental joy (*sukha,somanassa*) there is in the world, that is the gratification (*assāda*) in the world; that the world is impermanent, suffering and of the nature to change, that is the disadvantages (*ādīnava*) in the world—the removal and abandoning of desire and lust for the world, that is the escape from the world’.” (A 3.101/1:258, pointed out to me by Robert Eddison).

¹³⁵ **D** 2.64/1:70, **10.2.2/1:207**, **33.1.11(10)/3:225**; **M** 27.15/1:180, **33.20/1:223**, **38.35/1:269**, **51.16/1:346**, **53.8/1:355**, **94.18/2:162**, **101.33/2:226**; **S** 35.120/4:104, **35.239/4:176**; **A** 3.16/1:113, **4.14/2:16**, **4.37/2:39**, **4.164/2:152** (×4), **4.198.11/2:210**, **5.76.12/3:99 f**, **5.140.11/3:163**, **10.99.6/5:206**, **11.18.23/5:351**. For a study, see SD 9.14.

¹³⁶ “He acts with full awareness,” *sampajāna,kārī*, lit “he is one who works with full awareness.” **Sāmañña-phala S** (D 2.67/1:71) reading: *sati,sampajāna,kārī*, “he acts with mindfulness and full awareness,” so too below here [36]. As in **Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S** (D 22.4/2:293) = **Satipaṭṭhāna S** (M 10.8/1:57).

ATTAINING DHYANAS

Overcoming the 5 mental hindrances¹³⁷

36 Possessing this aggregate of noble virtue and this aggregate of noble sense-restraint and this aggregate of noble full awareness,¹³⁸ he seeks out a secluded dwelling: a forest, the foot of a tree, a mountain, a glen, a hillside cave, a charnel ground, a jungle grove, the open air, a heap of straw.¹³⁹

37 Returning from his almsround, after his meal, he sits down, crosses his legs, holds his body erect, and establishes mindfulness before him.¹⁴⁰

(1) Abandoning **covetousness** with regard to the world, he dwells with a mind devoid of covetousness. He cleanses his mind of covetousness.

(2) Abandoning **ill will and anger**, he dwells with a mind devoid of ill will, sympathetic with the welfare of all living beings. He cleanses his mind of ill will and anger.

(3) Abandoning **sloth and torpor**, he dwells with a mind devoid of sloth and torpor, mindful, alert, perceiving light. He cleanses his mind of sloth and torpor.

(4) Abandoning **restlessness and worry**, he dwells undisturbed, his mind inwardly stilled. He cleanses his mind of restlessness and worry.

(5) Abandoning **spiritual doubt**, he dwells having crossed over doubt, with no perplexity with regard to wholesome mental states. He cleanses his mind of doubt.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

The 4 dhyanas

38 (1) Having thus abandoned the five mental hindrances, impurities of the mind that weaken wisdom, quite detached from sensual pleasures, detached from unwholesome mental states, he enters and remains in **the first dhyana**, accompanied by applied thought (*vitakka*) and sustained thought (*vicāra*), accompanied by zest (*pīti*) and happiness (*sukha*) born of seclusion [ie *samādhī*].

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

39 (2) Furthermore, bhikshus, with the stilling of applied thought and sustained thought, by gaining inner tranquillity and oneness of mind, he enters and remains in **the second dhyana**, free from applied thought and sustained thought, accompanied by zest and happiness born of concentration.¹⁴¹

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

40 (3) And furthermore, bhikshus, with the fading away of zest, he remains equanimous, mindful and fully aware, and experiences happiness with the body. He enters and remains in **the third dhyana**, of which the noble ones declare, ‘Happily he dwells in equanimity and mindfulness.’

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

41 (4) And furthermore, bhikshus, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain—and with the earlier disappearance of joy and displeasure—he enters and dwells in **the fourth dhyana**, that is neither pleasant nor painful, and contains mindfulness fully purified by equanimity.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

¹³⁷ As in **Satipaṭṭhāna S** (M 10.36/1:60). See details in **Mahā Assa, pura S** (M 39.12-18/1:274 f).

¹³⁸ As in **Sāmañña, phala S** (D 2.67/1:71).

¹³⁹ “He seeks out... a heap of straw,” see **Mahā Assapura S** on wakefulness (M 39.12/1:274) & **Gaṇaka Moggallāna S** (M 107.8/3:3).

¹⁴⁰ Comy. He applies mindfulness towards his meditation subject; or he sets it up in the region of the mouth. As such, it is said in the Vibhaṅga: “This mindfulness is set up, set up well, at the tip of the nose or at the sign of the mouth” (Vbh §537/252). NT: The “sign of the mouth” (*mukha, nimitta*) is the middle region of the upper lip, against which the air strikes when it comes out of the nose.

¹⁴¹ The 2nd dhyana is known as “the noble silence” (*ariya, tuṅhī, bhāva*) because within it applied thought and sustained thought (thinking and discursion, *vitakka, vicāra*) cease, and with their cessation, speech cannot occur (S 2:273); cf S 4:293 where *vitakka* and *vicāra* are called verbal formation (*vacī, saṅkhāra*), the mental factors responsible for speech. In **Ariya, pariyesanā S** (M 1:161), the Buddha exhorts the monks when assembled to “either speak on the Dharma or observe the noble silence” (ie either talk Dharma or meditate).

THE THREE KNOWLEDGES
The mundane direct knowledge [§89-98]

(1) The knowledge of rebirth

42 With his concentrated mind thus purified, and bright, unblemished, free from defects,¹⁴² pliant, malleable, steady and utterly unshakable, he directs it to **the knowledge of the recollection of past lives**.¹⁴³ He recollects manifold past existence, that is to say, one birth, two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, twenty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, one hundred births, one thousand births, one hundred thousand births, many aeons of cosmic contraction, many aeons of cosmic expansion, many aeons of cosmic contraction and expansion, thus:

‘There I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my life-span. Passing away from that state, I re-arose here.’

Thus,¹⁴⁴ bhikshus, he recollects his manifold past lives in their modes and details.

Thus,¹⁴⁵ too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

(2) The knowledge of karma

43 With his mind thus concentrated, purified, and bright, unblemished, free from defects, pliant, malleable, steady and utterly unshakable, he directs it to **the knowledge of the passing away and re-arising of beings**.¹⁴⁶ He sees—by means of the divine eye [clairvoyance],¹⁴⁷ purified and surpassing the human—beings passing away and re-arising, and he knows how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate, in the heavens, in the suffering states, faring in accordance with their karma:

‘These beings, alas, sirs—who were endowed with evil conduct of body, speech, and mind, who reviled the noble ones, held wrong views and did actions under the influence of wrong views—after death, when the body has broken up, have re-arisen in a plane of misery, an evil destination, a lower realm, in hell.

But these beings, sirs—who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech, and mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and did actions under the influence of right views —after death, when the body has broken up, have reappeared in a happy destination, in heaven.’

Thus, by means of the divine eye, thus purified, surpassing the human, he sees beings passing away and re-arising, and how they fare according to their karma.

Thus, too, bhikshus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful. [227]

¹⁴² *Upakkilesa*: to be distinguished from *kilesa*, “defilement.” Perhaps the 10 “imperfections of insight” listed in *Vism* 20.105 ff are meant here, but potential hindrances at a certain stage of insight meditation. (Walshe)

¹⁴³ *Pubbe,nivāsanānussati*, lit “recollection of past abiding [existence].” The remainder of this is expanded into 4 sections in **Brahma,jāla S** (D 1.1.31-34/1:13-16 = SD 25.3(76.3)) and 3 sections in **Sampasādaniya S** (D 27.15-17/3:107-112 = SD 10.12). In both cases, each explains how the eternalist view arose.

¹⁴⁴ *Iti*.

¹⁴⁵ *Evam*.

¹⁴⁶ *Cutūpapāta ñāna*, or “knowledge of rebirth according to karma” (*yathā,kammūpaga ñāna*), or “the divine eye” (*dibba,cakkhu*): see foll n.

¹⁴⁷ *Dibba,cakkhu*, clairvoyance, not to be confused with the Dharma-eye (*dhamma,cakkhu*) (see n in §104). On the relationship of this knowledge to the 62 grounds for wrong views, see **Brahma,jāla S** (D 1) = SD 25.3(76.3). See pre c.

(C) DEVELOPMENT OF WISDOM

The supramundane direct knowledge [§44]

(3) The knowledge of the destruction of mental influxes

44 With his mind thus concentrated, purified, and bright, unblemished, free from defects, pliant, malleable, steady and utterly unshakable, the monk directs it to **the knowledge of the destruction of the mental influxes**.¹⁴⁸

He knows, as it is really is, “This is suffering (*dukkha*)”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the arising of suffering”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the ending of suffering”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the path to the ending of suffering.”¹⁴⁹

He knows, as it is really is, “These are mental influxes (*āsava*)”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the arising of influxes”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the ending of influxes”;
 He knows, as it is really is, “This is the path to the ending of influxes.”¹⁵⁰

45 His mind, thus knowing, thus seeing, is released from the influx of sensual desire, the influx of existence, the influx of ignorance.¹⁵¹ With release, there is the knowledge, ‘Released (am I)!’ He knows that ‘Birth is ended, the holy life has been lived, done is that which needs to be done. There is nothing further beyond this.’¹⁵²

Thus, too, bhikkhus, is the exertion fruitful, the striving fruitful.

The ten praiseworthy points

46 So speaks the Tathagata, bhikkhus. Such being what is spoken by the Tathagata, there are **ten justified [legitimate] grounds for praising what conforms to the Dharma**, thus.¹⁵³

(1) If, bhikkhus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by what was done in the past (*pubbe-kata, hetu*), then, bhikkhus, the Tathagata is *a doer of good karma in the past*, since they here and now feel such influx-free, pleasant feelings.

¹⁴⁸ *Āsava-k, khaya, ñāṇa*. The term *āsava* (lit “inflow, outflow”) comes from *ā-savati* “flows towards” (ie either “into” or “out” towards the observer). It has been variously translated as taints (“deadly taints,” RD), corruptions, intoxicants, biases, depravity, misery, evil (influence), or simply left untranslated. The Abhidhamma lists four *āsava*: the influx of (1) sense-desire (*kām’āsava*), (2) (desire for eternal) existence or becoming (*bhav’āsava*), (3) wrong views (*diṭṭh’āsava*), (4) ignorance (*avijjāsava*) (D 16.2.4, Pm 1.442, 561, Dhs §§1096-1100, Vbh §937). These four are also known as “floods” (*oghā*) and “yokes” (*yogā*). The list of three influxes (omitting the influx of views) [43] is probably older and is found more frequently in the Suttas (D 3:216, 33.1.10(20); M 1:55, 3:41; A 3.59, 67, 6.63). The destruction of these *āsavas* is equivalent to arhathood. See BDict under *āsava*.

¹⁴⁹ These 4 statements on suffering pose an interesting problem: they are not called “noble truths” here (nor in **Ariya, pariyesanā S**, M 26.43). Elsewhere, KR Norman (a non-Buddhist scholar) remarks that these four statements, which also likewise appear in **Mahā Saccaka S** (M 36.42/1:249), but are not referred to as the noble truths about suffering, “and since they appear to be subordinate to the four statements about the *āsavas*, it is possible that the statements about misery are a later addition [here], which led to a parallel, but inappropriate, set of four statements being evolved about the *āsavas*, to provide a symmetry” (Norman 1990a:27). For a discussion on the formulation of the noble truths, see Norman 1982:377-91 & also Schmithausen 1981:205.

¹⁵⁰ As in **Ariya, pariyesanā S** (M 26.42) = SD 1. On the application of the four noble truth template to both *dukkha* and to *āsava* here, see Analayo 2003:224 n28 & SD 17.4(8.4)

¹⁵¹ See §97a n.

¹⁵² *Nāparam itthatāya*: lit. “there is no more of ‘thusness.’” See **Mahānidāna S** (M 15.22) = SD 5.17.

¹⁵³ *Evam, vādim bhikkhave tathāgataṃ dasa saha, dhammikā pāsamsaṭṭhānā āgacchanti*. This passage is the positive counterpart of that at §22 (qv).

(2) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by a supreme God (*issara, nimmāna, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Tathagata must surely have been *created by a good supreme God*,¹⁵⁴ since they here and now feel such influx-free, pleasant feelings.

(3) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are circumstantial [caused by circumstance and nature] (*saṅgati, bhāva, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Tathagata must surely have *good luck*,¹⁵⁵ since they here and now feel such influx-free, pleasant feelings.

(4) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by class [being reborn in a certain social class] (*abhijāti, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Tathagata must surely *belong to a good class*,¹⁵⁶ since they here and now feel such influx-free, pleasant feelings.

(5) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now (*diṭṭha, dhamm-ūpakkama, hetu*), then, bhikshus, the Tathagata must surely *be striving well here and now*,¹⁵⁷ since they here and now feel such influx-free, pleasant feelings.

(6) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now, then, the Tathagata *is to be praised*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by striving here and now, the Tathagata *is (still) to be praised*.

(7) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by a supreme God, then, the Tathagata *is to be praised*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by a supreme God, the Tathagata *is (still) to be praised*.

(8) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are circumstantial [caused by circumstance and nature], then, the Tathagata *is to be praised*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* circumstantial, the Tathagata *is (still) to be praised*.

(9) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by class [being reborn in a certain social class], then, the Tathagata *is to be praised*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by class, the Tathagata *is (still) to be praised*.

(10) If, bhikshus, the pleasure and pain beings feel are caused by striving here and now, then, the Tathagata *is to be praised*. If the pleasure and pain beings feel are *not* caused by striving here and now, [228] the Tathagata *is (still) to be praised*.

So speaks the Tathagata, bhikshus. Such being what is spoken by the Tathagata, there are these ten justified [legitimate] grounds for praising what conforms to the Dharma.

So speaks the Tathagata, bhikshus. Such being what is spoken by the Tathagata, there are these ten justified [legitimate] grounds for praising what conforms to the Dharma.

The Blessed One said this. The monks joyfully approved of the Blessed One's word.

— evaṃ —

¹⁵⁴ *Bhaddakena issarena nimmito.*

¹⁵⁵ *Kalyāṇa, saṅgātijko.*

¹⁵⁶ *Kalyāṇābhijātiko.*

¹⁵⁷ *Kalyāṇa, diṭṭha, dhamm'upakkamo.*

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